三.Read the following paragraphs from an article titled "'Legal Feminism and the Emotions: Three Moments in an
Evolving Relationship" (Abrams 2005: 336-337) and translate into Chinese. (20%)
(A) Scholarship on the Emotions in the Constructivist Moment
Recent work on the emotions and law has continued to proliferate in the legal academy, as well as in the
fields of philosophy and political theory. It has pressed in ncw directions, some of which, interestingly, reflect
feminist and related critiques of enlightenment epistemology. Recent work, for example, is less focused on
challenging the dichotomous hierarchical upderstanding of reason and the emotions, or the inappropriateness of
emotion to the law.43 Reason and emotion are more often described as interpenetrating in effective thought or
sound legal argumentation.44 More notably, emotion itself is sometimes characterized as having a cognitive
element or cognitive structure. Martha Nussbauim has argued, for example, that disgust is an expression of
revulsion toward those attributes that reveal our animality.45 William Miller, comparing disgust and contempt,
notes the different ways that the lips curl in the physical expres sion of each; but he also distinguishes contempt
and disgust on the ground that contempt connotes a superior hierarchical relation to its objects, while disgust
demands their exile or abjection. 46
Second, recent scholarship refects the view that emotions (be they visceral or cognitive) are not the
expression of purely interior states. They are shaped and conditioned-in their forn and in the objects to which they
respond-by social understandings and practices. Cheshire Calhoun has argued, for example, that romantic love-an
emotion our culture has often regarded as the last outpost of the natural-is powerfully structured, or even
produced, by elaborate social scripts.47
Similarly, recent scholarship does not characterize emotion simply as being expressed, or repressed, by law.
Although contemporary scholarship on the emotions still reflects accounts in which law plays an expressive role
with respect to particular emotions-Dan Kahan's work on the expressive functions of the criminal law is a good
example of that tendency48-more recent accounts describe emotion as acted on, modified, and brought into
being by law in many different ways. Recent work by Martha Minow, for example, on legal responses to genocide
and related atrocities, stresses the way in which fact-finding can channel emotions away from uncontrolled hunger
for vengeance toward a more moderated desire for accountability.49 Robert Solomon describes the way that
Priminal law can temper, even as it gives effect to, the desire for retribution.50 Danielle Allen, writing about
ancient A thens, describes the way in which law need not simply express, but can also satisfy, anger at individual
offenses against the community.51
43.