14. Suppose a decision maker has a utility function U = √I and is faced with a lottery where there is a 30% chance of earning $30 and a 70% chance of earning $80. What is the expected utility of this lottery?
(A) 7.6
(B) 7.9
(C) 8.2
(D) 8.5

【已刪除】5. For this consumer, the optimal basket to buy would be (A) (x,y) = (9,3) (B) (x,y) = (3,1) (C) (x,y) = (1,3) (D) (x,y) = (3,9)

5. Suppose a consumer buys two goods, x and y , and has income of $30. Initially and the consumer chooses basket A with x =5 and y= 5. The prices change to and the consumer chooses basket B with x = 1 and y = 13. (A) These choices are not consistent with utility maximization. (B) With this information it is not possible to determine if these choices are consistent with utility maximization. (C) These choices are consistent with utility maximization. (D) Basket B must be strictly preferred to basket A .

6. Suppose the consumer’s utility function is given by U(x,y) = where The equation for this consumer’s demand curve for x is (A) (B) (C) (D)

7. Suppose the consumer’s utility function is given by U(x,y) = xy + y where The equation for this consumer’s demand curve for x when I ＞ (A) (B) (C) (D)

8. Consider a production function of the form Q = K 2 L2 with marginal products and . What is the marginal rate of technical substitution of labor for capital at the point where K = 5 and L = 5? (A) 5 (B) 25 (C) 50 (D) 1 

9. Consider the CES production function . This production function exhibits (A) decreasing returns to scale. (B) constant returns to scale. (C) increasing returns to scale. (D) either decreasing or constant returns to scale, but more information is needed to determine which one.

10. In the following game, all payoffs are listed with the row player’s payoffs first and the column player’s payoffs second. In Game (*) above,(A) Player A has a dominant strategy.(B) Player B has a dominant strategy.(C) Both players have dominant strategies.(D) Neither player has a dominant strategy.

11. In Game (*) above, (A) Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B1 is a Nash equilibrium. (B) Player A choosing A2 and Player B choosing B1 is a Nash equilibrium. (C) Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium. (D) there are no Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

12. In Game (*) above, in the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (A) player A chooses A1 with a 2/9 probability. (B) player A chooses A1 with a 3/9 probability. (C) player A chooses A1 with a 4/9 probability. (D) player A chooses A1 with a 5/9 probability.

13. In Game (*) above, if the players move sequentially with Player B choosing first, the Nash equilibrium will be (A) Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B1. (B) Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B2. (C) Player A choosing A2 and Player B choosing B1. (D) Player A choosing A2 and Player B choosing B2.

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